The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME VII | New York, Saturday, May 13, 1916 | Number 80

Contents

Editorial Notes 25

Leading Editorials
- Hypocritical Neutrality 28
- Commercial Independence for the Philippines 29
- Saving the Supreme Court 31
- Conservation in Peril 32

General Articles
- The Irish Revolt ..... Francis Hackett 34
- The Fall of a Mayor ..... William L. Chenery 36
- Strauss in the Alps ..... Daniel Gregory Mason 38
- The President or His Party ..... Edgar E. Robinson 40

A Communication
- The Duty of German-Americans ..... Kuno Francke 42

Correspondence 43

Books and Things ..... P. L. 44

Reviews of Books
- War—the Way Out ..... F. H. 45
- An American Feminist ..... E. B. 46
- Guiding the City 47
- Conquest by Law 48

PUBLIC opinion has on the whole acquiesced in Secretary Lansing's reply to the German note. It has acquiesced because the only recognized alternative to acquiescence is a rupture of diplomatic relations; it is reluctant to approve a break as long as Germany evinces any intention of respecting the lives of non-combatants at sea. But what Americans need to understand is that they are not confined to the alternatives of helpless acquiescence and the ambiguous gesture of a diplomatic rupture. The President is right in refusing to break with Germany on his own responsibility under conditions which would plunge the country into immediate war. Congress and the country should be expressly consulted before any decisive action is taken; but Congress and the country should be explicitly and quickly warned of the extreme probability of an ultimate rupture. They should be warned that a rupture is the deserved and normal result of the assistance which the United States is rendering to the enemies of Germany; and they should be shown how a rupture can be made to contribute to that ultimate security for all nations, which is an indispensable condition of the survival of democratic institutions.

HOW dubious and ominous are the relations between the United States and Germany as they are left by the last exchange of notes! The two countries are stumbling in the dark along a blind and treacherous foot-path. The real difficulties are being evaded or postponed. Germany does not formally abandon submarine warfare on commerce. She merely consents to regularize it, warning us in the meantime that even lawful warfare on commerce by submarines is likely to involve costly mistakes. But how can submarine operations against commercial vessels be subordinated to the law of visit and search as long as commercial vessels are permitted to be armed, and their captains are authorized to consider the mere approach of a submarine a hostile act? The vulnerability of a submarine is such that if merchant vessels are authorized and equipped to resist, it cannot survive as an orderly commerce destroyer. Finally, the killing of American citizens on the Lusitania has not been disavowed, and as long as it is neither disavowed nor some remedial action taken as a consequence of not being disavowed, Germany and the United States will be divided by a guilty feeling of common complicity in a terrible crime. As the situation now stands, Germany is cocking a pistol, pointing it at this country and declaring she will shoot unless we balance the aid rendered to her enemies by aid rendered to her. The American government pretends not to see the pistol, reproaches Germany with its bad manners and reaffirms its own immaculate and scrupulous correctness. Though the heavens fall and the mouth of hell yawns, we Americans always have one fixed star with which to guide our course. We can be legal; we can be utterly legal; we can be nothing but legal.

THE Glen Springs outrage points certain questions that millions of Americans would like to put to Carranza and Obregon. If they have the ability to stamp out banditry why do they sit idly by while murderous incursions are organized against our people on our own soil? If they have not the ability, what is all this talk of Mexican honor and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dignity and national sensibilities? While banditry operates unchecked in northern Mexico, bandits are sovereign, not the government at Mexico City. So long as this condition persists, it is with the bandits, not with the Mexican government, that we have to deal. In the work of suppressing border raids, Carranza has a right to a voice only in so far as he gives loyal and effective coöperation. The perpetrators of the Columbus crime were left unmolested by the de facto troops to find safe hiding places from the American wrath. The Glen Springs cut-throats will return unmolested to their villages, to boast of their heroic deeds. Carranza, enthroned upon his dignity, dictates memoranda, and Obregon makes impassioned speeches to General Scott. Are they so ignorant of human realities as not to know that on this side of the border more and more people are awakening to the emotion, How long, O Lord, how long?

WHEN our Civil War was drawing to a close, and the definite triumph of the North was seen to be assured, a great thirst for vengeance fell upon the unthinking population. At last Jeff Davis was to hang on a sour apple tree; at last the proscription of the rebel generals and haughty rebel civil officers was to begin. Other cares occupied the men who had fought and suffered in the war. What Grant and Sherman and their kind feared was that organized resistance might break up into guerilla warfare and this in turn into individual crime, endemic in the whole vast area of the South. Not mere surrender of the southern armies, but reconciliation, was what had to be achieved. If Carranza had attained a similar height of understanding, at the time when President Wilson strove to bring about a conference of all factions, a real peace might have been established. But Carranza thought he had the situation well in hand. Submission, not compromise, was his demand. In legalistic theory what room is there for compromise with the sovereign will? In real life there is no absolute sovereign will and all stable government rests on compromise. This Carranza did not see, and probably never will see.

PRESIDENT WILSON, in making his proposal for a conference, was doubtless well aware of the chaos in Mexico that would follow its rejection. But this was Mexico's private affair, at the time. It is such no longer. American soil has twice been violated, and there is not the least reason for supposing that such attacks as those upon Columbus and Glen Springs will not be repeated. We have not soldiers enough to form a cordon from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the mouth of the Colorado. We hear civilian mutterings because our soldiers were caught napping at Columbus and Glen Springs. If they remained awake twenty-four hours in the day, they could not secure safety for the border. The only practical expedient is to pursue the evil to its source, in the disorder and discontent of north Mexico and ultimately of the whole country. We shall have peace when Mexico has peace, and Mexican peace will flow, not from the First Chief's eighteenth century political speculations, but from practical measures of constitutional, financial and military reform. Evidence of progress toward such measures is what we ought to demand before we agree to the withdrawal of our troops.

DURING his colloquy with the delegation from the "American Union against Militarism," President Wilson gave expression to an admirably and completely sound body of doctrine about military preparedness and its relation to democracy. What he said in effect was that militarism does not depend upon the size of an army, nor upon its method of being recruited, trained and organized. It depends far more upon the kind of control exercised over the army. If the army controls the nation and dictates its policy, something like militarism results. If the whole nation really controls the army, militarism cannot result, unless the nation believes in it. But the way in which a nation should seek to control the army is not by systematically keeping it weak, helpless and innocuous, as we have done in the past. The only effective method of control is that of making the army the servant of a really national policy—one based upon the best immediate adjustment between the national ideals and the important prevailing conditions. If such a policy has not been formulated and popularized, an army of any size and character may become dangerously militaristic. If such a policy has been formulated and accepted, the size of the army and its organization are transformed into matters of detail, depending upon the requirements of the national policy. The essential condition of anti-militarism in this country is not a small navy and a small army but an adequate foreign policy based upon living conditions and acceptable to the American national conscience.

NEAR the end of the same colloquy the President indicated more explicitly than ever before the salient aspect of the policy which should determine American armament. "If the world undertakes," he said, "as we all hope it will undertake, a joint effort to keep the peace, it will expect us to pay our proportional part in organizing the force which backs up the effort. . . . If you say 'We shall not have any war,' you have got to have the force

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to make that 'shall' bite." So far as we know, this is the first clear enunciation by the President of his willingness to support a program analogous to that of the League to Enforce Peace. If so, he should soon begin to back up his conviction more explicitly and more emphatically. Adherence by the United States to the program of the League to Enforce Peace would mean a revolution in American foreign policy, for it would definitely commit this country to participation in the solution of European political problems. Yet such is the power over public opinion and the prestige of the American President that an explicit and emphatic statement by him of his intention to use his influence on behalf of such a League would promote it immediately from popular insignificance to popular importance and from the condition of a dubious international experiment into a question of practical foreign politics.

ONE hardly knows whether to be more angry or amused at the cautiously truculent manufacturers who have locked out their 60,000 employees. These manufacturers are decent, though uninspired citizens, honestly believing that the public has no right to interfere with their business, and hating with a truly capitalistic hate the whole breed of intermeddlers, sociologists and sentimentalists. Disliking the union, they have struck their blow at a time when they thought the union weakest and themselves strongest. They are willing to fight it out, their money against the workmen's hunger, and no ethical problems raised or tedious explanations given. The quarrel, they believe, is a very pretty quarrel as it stands, and will only be spoiled if talking takes the place of fighting. Therefore they do not state their case; do not tell what they want; do not specify their grievances. They are merely silent. But silence is confession. It is provocative, antisocial, ill-mannered, and suggests motives which dare not be revealed. At least so the public interprets it —even that section of the public which instinctively sides with employers. No wonder the manufacturers are bewildered. No wonder they begin to doubt whether their valor at the outset was not mere recklessness; whether it would not have been wiser to surrender the tactical advantage of striking at a favorable moment for the diplomatic advantage of at least seeming to be fair.

EVEN should the cloak manufacturers win, what would they gain? A costly strike, extended perhaps to other cities; public resentment; a bitter hatred on the part of the workers; the break-up of the union. But the union, if the manufacturers knew it, is quite as necessary to their own welfare as that of the workers. It was the union, and the Protocol agreement with the union, which dignified the industry and removed from the manufacturer the suspicion that he might be a mere sweater. The union is no less necessary to-day. Without a union the higher grade employers can not hold their own, for in this particular industry, sweaters, unless checked, can gain control by ruthlessly exploiting green immigrant labor. The only chance of the more scrupulous employer is to equalize labor conditions throughout the industry, and he cannot do this unless there is a powerful organization of wage-earners to enforce minimum conditions. If the trade union were destroyed it would have to be re-created by the manufacturers.

AMERICAN citizens have been led to form an excited dramatic conception of reform in city governments. A bad city administration is a summons to Armageddon. The true reformer is a person who flourishes a sword. In some respects this is a sound conception. When you get a city such as Chicago under Mayor Thompson, really controlled by a disreputable gang that is organized solely with a view to the perpetuation of a political machine, the sword is the symbol of reform. To dramatize an attack on such a government is the best way to excite moral ardor. But once the battle is victorious the test of a reform administration can no longer be the courage and fury of its fighting spirit. The test then becomes one of possession, not dispossession, of thoroughgoing and solid accomplishment. And the evidences of battle must be expected to vanish. The ploughshare cannot be as dramatic as the sword.

JUDGED by the way in which it answers the tests of sound administrative principle and capacity, Mayor Mitchel's recent annual report is a document that deserves national study. There is very little political drama recorded in this document, outside the school board and the department of charities. But there is something not less stirring, a drama of scrupulous and able human character put into the work of organizing and administering a complex city in an efficient and economic way. Waste breeds corruption in government. Economy serves the double purpose of keeping money in the pockets of the taxpayers and keeping it out of the pockets of the looters. As Mayor Mitchel has run New York City he has made it as uninteresting to the ordinary human parasite as a porcelain bath-tub is uninteresting to parasite insects. And as a result of his principles of economy and efficiency he is already able to show definite and impressive gains in the fields of public health, public protection, public charity, in the personnel and morale of his administration. These gains could not have been made if Mayor Mitchel had had an ulterior motive. But he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has had no ulterior motive. He has given New York what he was elected to give it, a municipal instead of a political machine.

Hypocritical Neutrality

PRESIDENT WILSON has decided to accept the "concessions" made in the last German note and repudiate the threats. He intends, that is, as usual, to wait and watch, trusting that in the thick of the most ruthless and destructive war of history the offenders will cease to offend. In the meantime he proposes to do nothing to make them less willing to offend or more anxious to be conciliating. Whatever else the German note conveys, it certainly bristles with a feeling of resentment towards the United States—as a country whose technical neutrality is hypocritical and which is behaving so as to be a stumbling block to Germany and an accomplice of her enemies. German resentment has become one of the outstanding and momentous facts in American international relationships. Yet the policy of the American government refuses to recognize its existence. No steps are proposed either to allay German ill-feeling, or to seek British and French support as a compensation, or to deal remedially with an international malady which for the first time in one hundred years has involved the United States in dangerous European controversies. To pursue so ambiguous and blind a policy in such a crisis is merely a confession by the American government of infirmity of purpose and poverty of statesmanship.

Many American newspapers have waxed highly indignant with the German government because it has presumed to lecture the United States on its failure to enforce what has been supposed to be international law against Great Britain as well as against Germany. Such indignation is childish. On any candid reading of the facts it is plain that the policy of the American government has been damaging to Germany and helpful to the Allies. The German government has every reason to count the actual effect of American policy as of the utmost importance in deciding how far it will comply with American demands. It has imperative reasons for seeking to use any concession which it may make to the United States as a club with which if possible to force similar concessions on Great Britain. The American government may not and should not yield to the threat, but American opinion should have sufficient common sense to recognize that in making it, the Germans are wholly within their rights. They know that Americans would be, to say the least, extremely reluctant to approve any course which would embarrass Great Britain in the prosecution of the war as we have embarrassed Germany; and they are trying to bring home to Americans the meaning and consequence of this fundamentally partial policy and state of mind.

From the beginning of the warfare against commerce carried on by submarines, the German government has been using them partly as a naval weapon and partly as a means of exposing to neutrals what they believe to be the injustice of prevailing British maritime policy. It has been playing the game two ways. If the submarine proved to be effective as a commerce destroyer, and if the United States and the other neutrals withdrew their citizens from British and French vessels, Germany might succeed in dealing to its most formidable enemy a terrific blow in the most vulnerable spot. On the other hand, if the United States made trouble, and the German government yielded to the protests, it could fall back on the alternative of pressing the neutral Americans to be equally exigent in dealing with British violations of neutral rights.

Left to itself the American government would deal drastically with Germany and leniently with Great Britain, because American opinion prefers the Allies to win; but the American government need not and should not be left to itself. The Germans fully realize the divided condition of American opinion and the extent to which we are seeking to be unneutral in policy without being actually caught in flagrantly unneutral acts. They understand the full force of the ideas and traditions and interests which are making for peace at any price and against an adventurous foreign policy and in favor of treating all belligerents alike. They are counting, consequently, on forcing the American government to adopt a policy of strict impartiality in the assertion of American rights as the only method of avoiding the risks and sacrifices of war. They are, in substance, asking the American people whether they are willing to be strictly and aggressively neutral and whether if not, they are prepared to accept the consequences.

The question is as fair as it is embarrassing. It lays bare the ambiguity and the infirmity of contemporary American opinion in relation to the European War. It defines the alternatives which, unless the war is soon over, will be inexorably imposed on the American government. Instead of being flouted and ignored its demands should be carefully considered. The American government and people have been insistently seeking some tepid and evasive middle course, some method of being offensive to Germany without being technically hostile or actually dangerous, some way of being safely and inexpensively righteous. The German note has exploded these illusions. It rightly insists that we must either go further or withdraw. It proph-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

esies war between the two countries in the event of a diplomatic break, and it indicates the only sure method of avoiding war. We must force Great Britain to allow us to place at least a part of our resources at the disposal of Germany. A grim alternative, but a real one: Either participation in a hideous war which involves so many exclusively European issues and which might place on future American industry burdens heavy enough to compromise our domestic stability; or a threat of coercion hurled at the mistress of the seas whose fleet has long been our protection, whose merchant marine carries our commerce, whose Canadian citizens are our most immediate neighbors, best customers and our closest associates, and whose army is fighting to free France and Belgium from the consequences of an aggressive attack.

The German threat should be answered by pushing forward rather than withdrawing. The United States should abandon a hypocritical neutrality which falsifies its proper relation to the European War and which prevents its effectively asserting neutral rights and international interests. The German note places the American government in precisely the situation anticipated by THE NEW REPUBLIC when in our issue of April 22nd we appealed to the President to abandon the pretense of being neutral. Germany asks us to choose between herself and the Allies. Formally the American government is asked to enforce international law. Actually it is asked to assist the Central Powers in winning the war. The choice should not be evaded. The American government should seek to vindicate international law, but not by becoming the accomplice of the Power which violated Belgium, deliberately planned the killing of so many innocent Americans on the Lusitania, and is now trying to profit by the results of successful military aggression. What international law needs is a sanction. If we announce to Germany that we shall not only break off diplomatic relations but actually aid her enemies unless she agrees to abandon submarine warfare against commerce, evacuate Belgium, France and Serbia, pay an indemnity to Belgium and accept the principle that in the future the resources of all the nations may be used against any nation against whom aggression can be clearly proved, we shall be taking the essential step towards the vindication of international right. The immediate victims would be Germany and Austria, but only in so far as they are aggressors. Ultimately the vindication of international right would tend to provide for them as well as for all nations, small and great, the kind of security which they rightly crave and which in so far as obtained as a consequence of superior military preparations is a threat to the security of their neighbors.

American public opinion will regard the proposed intervention as dangerously adventurous. It prefers to pay the certain cost of a military preparation necessitated by the absence of an authoritative international system rather than pay the contingent cost of an attempt to bring such a system into existence. It is ready to participate in any attempt at permanent pacification after the war is over; but it will do nothing to prepare the way for pacification by making the power of the United States count immediately in favor of an equitable international adjustment. It is hoping in this way to avoid the risk and expense of intervention; and if the war is brought to a quick end it may succeed. But in that case our country will have missed a unique opportunity to mould the terms of a treaty of peace in a desirable direction, and it will have earned the justifiable enmity of Germany without arranging for the support of France and Great Britain. The poor but probable consolation is that the war will not end quickly. If the war lasts another year or more the alternative presented by the German note will be pressed home. We shall be continuing to damage Germany and refusing to damage Great Britain until Germany finds it worth while to break loose, which will be at some extremely inconvenient time for the political welfare of the Wilson administration. Then we shall probably drift into the war handicapped, it may be, by a maximum of internal friction and without the guidance of a constructive policy calculated to promote our own security and wellbeing or that of other nations.

Commercial Independence for the Philippines

THE Philippines are to remain American possessions. This is the will of the majority in Congress. It is the will, in all probability, of a still more decisive majority of the American people. Now, what are we hoping to gain from this remote colony? A profitable market? The net profits from our trade with the Philippines will never pay the cost of maintaining an army and navy sufficient to defend them. Are we cherishing desires for profitable concessions? It is undoubtedly the wish of most Americans that concessions in the Philippines shall be so carefully drawn that no extraordinary profits will remain for the grantees. Are we actuated by the sentimental dogma that where the American flag has been raised it shall never come down, by the mania of bigness, the mirage of the map? Such schoolboy motives may once have had a hold upon us. They have none now. We are holding the Philippines for the sake of a dream.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is the dream of a new, free nation, fit member of the world's family, launched upon its historical course by our efforts. We want the Philippines to be—naturally in their appropriately lesser measure—what Japan has become, a modern nation strong and orderly, to give the lie to the myth that good government is a west-European monopoly.

Men of easy social philosophy do indeed assure us that the Filipinos will never be capable of self-government. They haven't political instinct. Perhaps there is such a thing as political instinct, and perhaps the Filipinos haven't it. So much we know: very diverse stocks have attained to political stability under good constitutional arrangements and in progressive economic circumstances. We also know that excellent racial stocks have lived chaotically under bad constitutional arrangements—witness Germany and Italy before union was effected—and excellent constitutions have failed to produce good government in archaic economic circumstances—witness Mexico. Our duty to the Philippines is to work out a satisfactory political constitution for them, something that is relatively easy, and to set them on their way toward an independent economic development, something that is extremely difficult. What this involves is an increased production of wealth, in order that public burdens may be supported with ease; a great intensification of inter-island commercial relations, in order that tribal and racial differences may be ironed out under a common economic interest; and the relaxation of the commercial bonds that tie the Philippines too closely to one foreign nation, the United States, and the establishment of closer relations than now obtain with other foreign nations. The Philippines belong by nature in the oriental trading system. They ought to trade largely with Japan, China, Indo-China, India. Their relations with the Occident ought to be distributed, with a fair degree of impartiality, between the United States, England, Germany and France. It is such a multiplicity of relations that produces commercial independence, that stimulates variety of production, that develops the best energies of the population. What is the Democratic party, champion of Philippine independence, doing to create such commercial independence? Nothing. It is still employing the Republican colonial policy under which we strive, and strive successfully, to monopolize the trade of the colony. Our Philippine commercial policy is nothing other than the ancient policy of colonial trade exploitation. It is practically identical with the French policy of tariff assimilation, adopted by the ultra-protectionists of 1892 and applied to Madagascar and Indo-China to the distress of those colonies and the disgust of the more liberal world.

We admit Philippine products free to our protected markets; the Philippines admit our products free, practically, to theirs. Is not this a fair trade? It is not denied that the Philippines have profited from our open markets. But the object of the arrangement is our profit, not that of the colony. It is intended to make of the Philippines a commercial dependency of the United States, and this is in fact the result. Philippine trade with us, which by nature should be only a minor branch, has been forced to exceed the Philippine trade with all the rest of the world together.

Our Philippine commercial policy is anomalous. It does not square with our intentions to prepare the Philippines for independence. And if our colonial experience is not sufficiently extensive to provide us with suggestions as to a better policy, we can borrow such a policy ready made from the colonial reformers of our sister democracy, France. What the French colonial reformers have proposed—and but for the war their proposals might well have been enacted in law—is that the great dependencies, Madagascar and Indo-China, whose situation is strictly analogous to that of the Philippines, shall have tariff systems designed with special reference to their needs and not to the cupidities of nationalistic traders.

We ought to create for the Philippines an expert commission with power to elaborate an independent tariff, against us as well as against the rest of the world, capable of encouraging industrial development and stimulating inter-island trade. We ought to negotiate for the Philippines commercial treaties with foreign nations by which, in return for suitable concessions, the trade with the Philippines would be thrown open on terms equivalent to those we enjoy. We ought gradually to withdraw our special trade concessions to the Philippines until they are placed on merely a most-favored-nation footing—the footing on which we should stand ourselves in the Philippines.

Under this system we should at first lose a certain amount of trade to our foreign competitors, and we should never again command so large a proportion of the Philippine trade as now. But the aggregate trade of the Philippines at present is insignificant as compared with the colony's potential trading capacity, and it might very well be that under the stimulus of relations with the whole world, the aggregate trade of the islands would develop so rapidly that in a short time our absolute volume would be greater than before. For many years the trade of France with her open-door colonies has developed more rapidly than her trade with colonies monopolized as we monopolize the Philippines. But granted that we lose trade, and never fully recover it, we are retaining the Philippines not for the sake of our trade but for the sake of our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dream of a new nation launched. It is in our power to establish the new nation in so far as commercial relations are concerned. We shall do this, if our dream is more than a bit of vulgar imperialistic hypocrisy.

We have been the most ardent advocates of the principle of the open door. We wrought manfully for the open door in Korea, in Manchuria; we are still intensely occupied with the maintenance of the open door in China. With what face did we insist upon the open door in dependencies and spheres of influence of other powers when at our first opportunity we clapped the door to in ours? Commercial independence for the Philippines means the open door. Such a policy would give to our diplomatic representations on the open door a moral validity that candor compels us to admit they have hitherto lacked.

Saving the Supreme Court

IF the gentlemen who oppose Mr. Brandeis had to explain their reasons to their God, they would want to say, we believe, that they have worked to protect the Supreme Court of the United States, that their highest consideration, and their only one, was to conserve a great institution. They would resent the suggestion that Mr. Brandeis has won the enemies he has because he lowered the price of gas in Boston, because he created popular insurance, because without fee and at great personal sacrifice he criticized a great monopoly, because he prophesied with terrible accuracy a rottenness in railroad management, because he fought the great rate cases, because he revealed a conspiracy on the part of President Taft and two members of his cabinet to deceive the American public, because he raised the class struggle in an anarchic industry to the plane of civilized adjustment, because he invented a new and compelling method of arguing constitutional cases, because he criticized the concentration of credit, because he resisted industrially wasteful methods of combination through banker management and the interlocking directorate, because he recognized the value of trade unionism. The gentlemen who oppose Mr. Brandeis will tell you it is not because of these things that they oppose him. True, these activities of his have often "hit them where they live," but no selfish interest, no class feeling, no caste feeling has for one moment clouded their impartial judgment. It is merely a question of professional integrity with them. They are not against Mr. Brandeis because he is, as Mr. Arthur Hill said, "a radical, an outsider and a Jew." Not for a moment. Such thoughts have never stained their minds. They are against him for the reason stated in Mr. Austen Fox's brief.

They have discovered that for some unaccountable reason Mr. Brandeis has a mania for betrayal. It is unaccountable because this mania runs against all the usual motives for betrayal. We are acquainted with the man who sells out his client or deserts a cause in order to make money or gain social prestige. But here is a madman who sacrifices his best clients, who faces ostracism, who accepts relentless enmities, who yields money, power, place, just because he has a lunatic desire to betray his clients. Here is a man who gives up big fees to work for small ones, who gives up large retainers in order to work gratis, who gives up endless opportunity in order to spend twenty-five thousand dollars of his own money to expose the New Haven Railroad. Clearly this man is not only dishonest, he is mad, and the Supreme Court must be protected against him.

Unhappily the mass of the American people would draw a different conclusion from the defeat of Mr. Brandeis. They would not feel that the Court had been protected. They would feel and they would say that the agitators are right, that a liberal who has faced the music cannot be appointed to the Court. All those who have believed in the recall of judges would say that here is proof positive of what they have asserted. They would read into it a demonstration that only the tried friend of wealth and power can reach that Court, they would say with that human crudity which is so deplorable, that Mr. Brandeis was beaten because he is the greatest living American engaged in curbing the rich and the powerful.

So in a sense the Court would not be protected, the confidence of the people would be shaken to the depths. Their confidence in it would be less than it has ever been since the Dred Scott decision. These gentlemen opposing Mr. Brandeis, from the highest motives, would if they succeeded inflict irreparable damage on the prestige of the institution they wish to protect. If only they had some vision they would see that the charges against him have recoiled upon them by the sheer excess of overstatement, that even the Republican minority has turned away in disgust from that brief of Mr. Fox's, which is so obviously actuated by a will to believe the worst. They would see that the organized propaganda, the veiled insinuations, the malicious gossip are proof of their prejudice against him. If they had any vision, they would know that the presence of Mr. Brandeis on the Supreme Court would instantly restore popular confidence in it, would instantly silence those who regard it as a bulwark against democracy, would give the lie to those who say that the humblest are not represented in the highest tribunal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If their reckless campaign succeeded, what would they have done? Would they have ruined and silenced Brandeis? They would have made him the leader of American liberalism. Indeed there are many radicals who hope he will not be confirmed, because they wish once and for all to destroy respect for the court, because they want his superb abilities employed not to interpret and strengthen the law, but to formulate and lead an insurgent democracy. "Defeat him and you give us a hero" is the inner conviction of these radicals. They are right. Mr. Brandeis would be the man he has always been, sane, constructive, careful and sure. But where he had a few followers, he would have many. For when a man has reached his eminence, even the highest judicial office can add little to his fame. The denial of that office would raise him, without effort on his part and without desire on his part, to popular leadership. There is a deep truth in the statement of one of the most important officials in the government, who said that the Court needs Brandeis now more than he needs it.

Conservation in Peril

THE National Conservation Congress, which held its sessions in Washington May 2-4, has overwhelmingly endorsed two iniquitous bills introduced by Senator Shields of Tennessee and Senator Myers of Montana, regarding the control of water power, and has failed to endorse any conservation measure looking to public control. This Congress, which since 1909 has been the public forum of the National Conservation Association, has thus been completely captured by the states' rights advocates and by the water-power interests. The Shields and Myers bills propose to give practically in perpetuity the control of the water powers —our last great natural asset—into the hands of special interests. Strenuous efforts were made at the last stormy session of this Congress in 1913, held also in Washington, to accomplish the desired result. Defeated at that time, the water-power interests have finally succeeded in capturing the machinery of the Congress.

These two bills supplement each other. The Shields bill relates to the development of water power on navigable streams; the Myers bill applies to all public lands of the United States except national parks and military reservations. Their worst feature is the practically perpetual character of the grant. Although the rights for the development of water power both on navigable streams and public lands are apparently limited to fifty years, this limitation is practically nullified by the subsequent provisions for "recapture" or renewal of the grant. In the Shields bill the fifty-year limitation is, in fact, placed not upon the grant, but upon the right of the United States or other public agency to condemn the properties. If the fifty-year provision were omitted, the public could condemn at any time, whereas by the limitation, the United States is prevented from taking any action until the period has expired. If after fifty years the properties are not purchased at full condemnation value by the United States itself or by someone whom it may authorize and who has qualified by securing priority to the water rights, then the grant must be renewed to the original grantee "upon the same terms and with the same restrictions" as are named in the bill, and thereafter is subject to neither alteration nor amendment, regardless of future legislation or the policy which the government may hereafter adopt toward water-power development.

Thus the evident intent of the bill is to allow the water-power interests to secure upon navigable rivers and at government dams rights and equities which can never be diminished or altered save at the expense of purchasing at market value all properties tangible and intangible that have been constructed or acquired and have any connection, direct or indirect, with the business of the grantee. Moreover, no procedure is provided whereby officers of the United States may take action to acquire properties of the grantee. The price to be paid in case of purchase includes every element of value that could ever be brought forward in condemnation proceedings, save only the grant itself; and even this may be included should the United States purchase from a transferee of the original grantee rather than from the grantee himself. Thus the "recapture" of the grant by the United States is made extremely difficult; and, what is even more significant, "recapture" by municipal corporations, which, of all public agencies, are the most likely to take over the development of the water power of navigable streams, is made almost impossible. Thus after fifty years municipal corporations which may desire to take over water-power development are placed exactly on the same footing as private applicants. They must pay full market value for all property, tangible or intangible, including increments in land values and in water rights, and all franchises, save that granted by the United States. Even then they could not become qualified transferees unless they had acquired from the original lessee at voluntary sale all prior water rights. Such transfer, therefore, can be made only upon the consent of the water-power companies to whom this right is now given. Water-power development by municipalities has increased rapidly in recent years and would increase still more rapidly in the future if an opportunity were given, not only to initiate new develop-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment but to acquire at a reasonable price plants which are already developed. Under the provisions of the Shields bill the right of " recapture " is therefore merely a sop.

In return for the full general privileges which it is proposed to grant, no compensation whatever is required. Only in the event that public lands of the United States are occupied, or the grantee receives some actual measurable benefit on the ground of headwater improvements constructed by the United States government, or makes use of a government dam, is a rental provided; and even this rental, under the terms of the Shields bill, would be merely nominal, bearing no relation to the value of the privileges granted.

The Myers bill goes even farther. It turns over for unlimited commercial exploitation all water power on public lands, national forests, and national monuments, including specifically the Grand Canyon National Monument. No executive officer can refuse to grant a lease, however injurious the proposed development, or however it interferes with the main purpose for which a national forest or a national monument was created. For example, no lease could be refused within the Grand Canyon National Monument, even if it were certain that the plans of the lessee would utterly destroy the scenic value of the Grand Canyon. As in the case of the Shields bill, the lease cannot be terminated at the expiration of fifty years except upon the purchase of the properties by the government at full market value, and even then such action can be taken by the United States government only when the properties are needed for governmental purposes, and by any other public agency only with the voluntary acquiescence of the lessee—the water-power company to whom the lease was originally granted. In the value of the properties is included not only the cost of the property itself, but all increase in land values and water-right values. The terms of purchase are precisely those that would be required if the properties were situated on private lands and no government privilege had been granted.

For all practical purposes, therefore, the Myers bill gives control over public water-power sites as irrevocably into the hands of private interests as though it parted with the title to the land. By making the issuance of a lease mandatory upon the Secretary, by requiring no rental until the plant is in operation, by requiring the lessee to make development only as market demands require, the bill renders it possible for a single group of interests to secure control over all available power sites upon public lands tributary to any important market, and to hold such sites indefinitely, whether developed or not, so long as what appear to be the reasonable demands of the market are being supplied. Had the bill aimed to encourage the monopolization of water-power sites it could not have been drafted in more emphatic language.

By indorsing these two water-power bills, the National Conservation Congress has clearly shown that it has become nothing but an annex to the water-power lobby, of whose activities Washington has seen so much during this past winter while the bills were pending in Congress. The Committee on Water Power, whose recommendations the National Conservation Congress endorsed, was completely controlled by representatives, among others, of the Utah Power Company, the Georgia Power Company, the General Electric Company, the Alabama Power Company, and the Aluminum Company of America.

Under the guise of national efficiency masquerading in the cloak of patriotism, asserting the need of preparedness by developing water power to manufacture nitrates so essential for ammunition and fertilizers, the water-power interests have sought to undermine true national efficiency and plunder the nation for their personal benefit.

This action must forever destroy public confidence in the Conservation Congress. From now on no citizen who really desires the constructive development of our natural resources under public control will have anything to do with a gathering of self-seeking interests for the despoiling of the natural assets of our country. By adroitly changing the object of the Conservation Congress from development and conservation of our natural resources, to mere development, Mr. R. Lee Worsham, the President, and Mr. G. E. Condra, the Chairman of the Executive Committee (now elected President), have taken conservation out of the Conservation Congress and destroyed its force as an organization for true conservation work.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1916, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY
PHILIP LITTELL
WALTER E. WEYL
WALTER LIPPMANN
FRANCIS HACKETT
ALVIN S. JOHNSON

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE.

REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Irish Revolt

> "It may be a good thing to forget and forgive; but it is altogether too easy a trick to forget and be forgiven."—G. K. Chesterton in "The Crimes of England," 1916.

WHEN a rebellion has failed men say it was wicked or foolish. It is, on the contrary, wickedness and folly to judge in these terms. If men rise against authority the measure of their act cannot be loyalty or prudence. It is the character of the authority against which men revolt that must shape one's mind. No free man sets an ultimate value on his life. No free man sets an ultimate sanction on authority. Is it just authority, representative, tolerable? The only revolt that is wicked or foolish is the revolt against reasonable or tolerable authority. If authority is not livable, revolt is a thousand times justified.

The Irish rebellion was not prudent. Its imprudence did not weigh with the men who took to arms. Had hope inspired them they would have been utterly insane. But hope did not inspire them. They longed for success, they risked and expected death. The only consequence to us, wrote Padraic Pearse before action, is that some of us may be launched into eternity. "But who are we, that we should hesitate to die for Ireland. Are not the claims of Ireland greater on us than any personal ones? Is it fear that deters us from such an enterprise? Away with such fears. Cowards die many times, the brave only die once." To strike a decisive blow was the aspiration of the Irish rebels. But decisive or not, they made up their minds to take action before the government succeeded in attaching all their arms.

In this rebellion there was no chance of material victory. Pearse, MacDonagh, Connolly, Clark, Plunkett, O'Rahilly, O'Hanrahan, Daly, Hobson, Casement, could only hope against hope. But their essential objective was not a soldiery. It was an idea, the idea of unprotested English authority in Ireland. It was to protest against the Irish nation remaining a Crown Colony of the British Empire that these men raised their republican standard and under it shed their blood. In the first process of that revolt few of them were immediately sacrificed. Their fight was well planned. They made the most of their brief hour. But when they were captured the authority they had opposed fulfilled their expectations to the utmost. Before three army officers, without a legal defender, each of the leaders was condemned by court-martial. Their rebellion had been open. Their guilt was known and granted. They met, as they expected to meet, death.

The insurrection in Ireland is ended. A cold tribunal has finished by piecework the task that the soldiers began. The British Empire is still dominant in Dublin. But ruthless and remorseless behavior sharpens the issue between authority and rebellion. Even men who naturally condemn disorder feel impelled to scrutinize the authority which could deliberately dispense such doom. If that authority deserved respect in Ireland, if it stood for justice and the maintenance of right, its exaction of the pound of flesh cannot be questioned. It does not represent "frightfulness." It represents stern justice. Its hand should be universally upheld. But if, on the other hand, English authority did not deserve respect in Ireland, if it had forfeited its claims on these Irishmen, then there is something to be made known and said about the way in which this Empire can abuse its power.

Between the Irish people and English authority, as everyone knows, there has been an interminable struggle. A tolerable solution of this contest has only recently seemed in sight. The military necessity of England has of itself precluded one solution, the complete independence of Ireland. The desire for self-government in Ireland has opposed another solution, complete acquiescence in the union. Between these two goals the struggle has raged bitterly. But human beings cannot live forever in profitless conflict. After many years the majority of the English people took up and ratified the Irish claims to self-government. In spite of the conservative element in England and the British element in Ireland, the *modus vivendi* of home rule was arranged. It is the fate of this *modus vivendi,* accepted by the majority of Irishmen as a reasonable commutation of their claims, that explains the recent insurrection. These men who are dead were once for the most part Home Rulers. Their rebellion came about as a sequel to the unjust and dishonest handling of home rule.

For thirty-five years home rule has been an issue in Great Britain. The majority of the British people supported Gladstone during many home rule sessions. The lower house of Parliament repeatedly passed the measure. The House of Lords, however, turned a face of stone to Ireland. It icily rejected Ireland's offer to compound her claims. This irreconcilable attitude proved in the end so monstrous that English Liberalism revolted. It threw its weight against the rigid body that denied it. It compelled the House of Lords to accept the Parliament act, its scheme for circumventing the peers'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

veto. Then, three times in succession, it passed the home rule bill.

Everyone knows what happened. During the probation of the bill the forces that could no longer avoid it constitutionally made up their minds that they would defeat it unconstitutionally. Men left the House of Lords and the House of Commons to raise troops in eastern Ulster. These, not the Irish, were Germany's primary allies in the British Isles. Cannon, machine guns and rifles were shipped to Ireland. Every possible descendant of the implanted settlers of Ireland was rallied. Large numbers were openly recruited and armed. The Ulster leaders pleaded they were loyal but they insisted that the Liberals of England did not and could not speak for the empire. The only English authority they recognized was an authority like-minded to themselves. Lord Northcliffe joined with Lord Londonderry and Lord Abercorn and Lord Willoughby de Broke and Lord Roberts and Sir Edward Carson and Bonar Law to advise and stimulate rebellion. Some of the best British generals in the army, to the delight of Germany, were definitely available as leaders. A provisional government, with Carson as its premier, was arranged for in 1911. The Unionist and Orange organizations pledged themselves that under no conditions would they acknowledge a home rule government or obey its decrees. In 1912 the Solemn Covenanters pledged themselves "to refuse to recognize its authority." During this period the government negotiated, but took no action. There were no Nationalists under arms.

If free men have a right to rebel, how can anyone gainsay Ulster? It was the Ulster contention that home rule would be unreasonable, intolerable, and unjust. This was a prophecy, perhaps a natural and credible prophecy. But it is not necessary to debate the Ulster rebellion. It was a hard heritage of England's crime against Ireland. It is enough to say that English authority refused to abandon the home rule measure and in April, 1914, Mr. Asquith promised to vindicate the law.

The British League for the support of Ulster had sent out "war calls." The Ulster Unionist Council had appropriated $5,000,000 for volunteer widows and orphans. Arms had been landed from America and, it was said, from Germany. Carson had refused to "negotiate" any further. His mobilization in 1914 became ominous. The government started in moving troops to Ulster. The King intervened. Mr. Balfour inveighed against the proposal to use troops. The army consulted with Carson. Generals French and Ewart resigned.

About this period, with Asquith and Birrell failing to put England's pledges to the proof, the National Volunteers at last were being organized. Mr. Asquith temporized further. At his behest John Redmond peremptorily assumed control of the Volunteers. Their selected leader was Professor MacNeill, a foremost spirit in the non-political Gaelic revival. There was formal harmony until the European war was declared, when Mr. Redmond sought to utilize the National Volunteers for recruiting. This move made definite the purely national dedication of the Irish Volunteers.

Four events occurred in rapid succession to destroy the Irish Volunteers' confidence in English authority. These were decisive events, and yet events over which the Irish Volunteers could have no control.

On July 10th, 1914, armed Ulster Volunteers marched through Belfast and Sir Edward Carson held the first meeting of his provisional government.

On July 26th, 1914, the British troops killed four persons and wounded sixty persons because rowdies had thrown stones at them in Dublin, subsequent to their futile attempt to intercept Irish Volunteer arms.

On Sept. 19th, 1914, the home rule bill was signed, but its operation indefinitely suspended.

In May, 1915, Sir Edward Carson became a member of the British Cabinet.

These events were endured by John Redmond. He had early accepted a Fabian policy and put his trust in Englishmen who shirked paying the price of maintaining the law they decreed. The more radical men in Dublin were not so trusting. They had heard Asquith promise that no permanent division of Ireland would be permitted, and they learned he had bargained for it. They had heard him promise he would vindicate the law, and they saw him sanction the defiant military leader as commander-in-chief and the defiant civil leader as a minister of the crown. With the vivid memory of British troops killing Irish citizens on the streets of Dublin, they drew their conclusions as to English honor. They had no impulse to recruit for the defense on the Continent of an Empire thus honorable. They looked back on the evil history they had been ready to forget. They prepared to strike and to die.

Irishmen like myself who believed in home rule and disbelieved in revolution did not agree with this spirit. We thought southern Ireland might persuade Ulster. We thought English authority was possibly weak and shifty, but benign. We did not wish to see Ireland, in the words of Professor MacNeill, go fornicating with Germany. When our brothers went to the European war we took England's gratitude as heartfelt and her repentance as deep. Our history was one of forcible conquest,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

torture, rape, enforced subservience, ignorance, poverty, famine. But we listened to G. K. Chesterton about Englishmen in relation to magnanimous Ireland: "It was to doubt whether we were worthy to kiss the hem of her garment."

All the deeper, then, the shock we received from the execution of our men of finest mettle. They were guilty of rebellion in wartime, but so was De Wet in South Africa. There seems to have been a calculation based on the greater military strength of the Dutch. A government which had negotiated with rebels in the North, which had allowed the retention of arms in Ulster, which had put Carson in the Cabinet, could not mark an eternal bias in its judgment of brave men whose legitimate constitutional prospects it had raised high and then intolerably suspended. But this English government, often cringing and supine, was brave enough to slay one imprisoned rebel after another. It did so in the name of "justice," the judges in this rebellion being officers of an army that had refused to stand against rebellion in Ulster.

It is not in vain, however, that these poets and Gaelic scholars and Republicans have stood blindfolded to be shot by English soldiers. Their verdict on English authority was scarcely in fault. They estimated with just contemptuousness the temper of a ruling class whose yoke Ireland has long been compelled to endure. Until that yoke is gone from Ireland, by the fulfillment of England's bond, the memory of this rebellion must flourish. It testifies sadly but heroically that there are still Irishmen who cannot be sold over the counter, Irishmen who set no ultimate sanction on a dishonest authority, Irishmen who set no ultimate value on their merely mortal lives.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

The Fall of a Mayor

A YEAR ago William Hale Thompson was elected mayor of Chicago by a majority of one hundred and fifty thousand—the largest the city has ever given an executive. Enthusiasts praised this exuberant political hero as a public leader akin to Theodore Roosevelt, one in the lineage of Lincoln. He was talked of as a presidential possibility, and a series of felicitous events seemed to add strength to his aspiration. Yet to-day Mr. Thompson bears the active hatred of a large section of his community; his own city has refused to elect him even as one of the eight delegates to the Republican national convention, and only by the courtesy of voters outside Chicago will he be seated in that assembly.

Yet unwittingly William Hale Thompson has served his city. The very ruthlessness of his effort to debauch public service and thereby to construct a political machine has been a benefit of great significance. For thereby as rarely before—at least since John Maynard Harlan led a mob of reformers armed with nooses to the City Hall to intimidate a "gray wolf" council, apparently intent on donating the public streets to Charles T. Yerkes—have the men and women of Chicago been so aroused to the implications and possibilities of citizenship. The mere name of the city's chief officer excites deep passions; the issues and the shibboleths on which the battle is being fought for and against him stir up the depth of civic need. By his very blunders Mr. Thompson has awakened the people.

To understand the situation it is necessary to take a glimpse of the winter and spring of 1915. Prosperity had not come in sight; liberalism everywhere east of the Sierra Nevadas appeared to have reached the vanishing point. Carter H. Harrison, for twelve years mayor of Chicago, had been eliminated by a kinsman of Roger C. Sullivan in the democratic primary. William Hale Thompson, cowboy and athlete, fresh-water commodore and a long-time follower of former Senator William Lorimer, had won a narrow victory over Judge Harry Olson chiefly because of the indolence and the small jealousies of the regular Republican organization.

When Robert M. Sweitzer, Sullivan's candidate, polled a primary vote nearly one hundred thousand larger than that attained by Mr. Thompson, a Democratic victory seemed sure. But within a few weeks the furies were let loose and Chicago had a new type of campaign. A semi-secret organization called the Guardians of Liberty came into prominence, and beneath the surface of discussion the fire of religious prejudice burned madly. Many Protestants had felt for some time that the public schools were being managed in the interest of the Catholic parochial schools. Several incidents of flagrant interference were brought to light by debates in the city council. The feeling was deep-seated and it had grown with the years. Carter H. Harrison's pernicious habit of recognizing national and religious and political groups in appointing the members of the board of education had intensified the situation. People felt that the public schools, the one agency of government which touches most intimately the greatest number, were out of their reach. Unseen influences and the church seemed to have the final word in matters of education.

Then, too, Sullivan's candidate symbolized big business to the mass of non-Catholic voters. Sullivan, the boss, was reputed still to be a gas magnate. The State Street department stores, the public utilities, all the great financial interests were supposed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be backing the Democrat. Consequently the little men and women, the clerks and trade-unionists and small storekeepers, the faithful Methodists and Baptists and Christian Scientists, the Lutherans and the active fraternal organizations, mobilized indiscriminately. There was no leadership. No general was needed to give the word.

It was a popular revolt of the simplest and most sincere character. The people of Chicago wanted a stick with which to hammer the men who, as they believed, stood for big business as against the common welfare, the men who stood for religion in politics, for adulterated education. William Hale Thompson was the stick they chose. People forgot for the moment that he was a petty Lorimer lieutenant. Besides, Senator Lorimer was known to be in misfortune; political industry could no longer use him. Consequently the voters were willing to forgive Thompson all his associations. What mattered Lorimerism in the face of greater, present evils? Thus Mr. Thompson became mayor.

Then came the street car strike and its dramatic settlement in the mayor's office. Mayor Thompson got the credit for this—fallaciously. His way of settlement was a request for 50,000 rounds of ammunition and nearly a half a million dollars to equip additional policemen. The liberal element in the council settled the strike, but Mr. Thompson's press agent was skillful and the Mayor was acclaimed. That was in June and the Thompson wave was at its height. Nothing seemed impossible.

Then commenced the decline. Twelve days after the Mayor assumed office, he abolished the efficiency division of the civil service commission. A few reformers objected at the time, but to the great majority the event was without significance. Actually, however, it presaged the spoils era which was to come, for the efficiency division was Chicago's one distinction in the science of municipal government. Through it the council had been slowly able to arrive at a general view of matters. The appropriating body was enabled by the aid of the efficiency experts to meet the administration heads on something approaching equality. It marked Chicago's gradual emergence from the epoch of log-rolling, precinct and ward politics. Now the efficiency jobs were abolished and new names were attached to the salaries. A sporting writer was given the position previously occupied by a university-trained engineer.

The same process went on in other departments. A former Salvation Army leader was given a high position in the health department in defiance of the civil service law. Within his first four months, Mayor Thompson had made 9,163 temporary appointments—the spoilsman's method of evading civil service. There was no finesse about this. Each department of the city government was ransacked. The municipal tuberculosis commission—one of Chicago's many independent governing bodies—was invaded, and not even at the board of education did the Mayor's job-hunger stop.

The apology for this creation of a mid-western Tammany is interesting. A woman, one of the leaders of a group of church organizations covering the city, said: "Do you know why my people don't mind this spoils talk in the newspapers? Well, I'll tell you. They tell us that the city hall was filled up with Catholics, that the Pope is the real power in Chicago. They say it may be necessary to crack the civil service law a little to get the Catholics out. My people are willing to see the law broken for that reason." The church leader was speaking for the last great group who are still loyal to Mayor Thompson. That part of the population which will sacrifice everything to the traditional religious animosities, alone among the larger divisions of the people, still adheres to the Mayor.

The spectacular closing of the Sunday saloons last autumn operated for a time in Mr. Thompson's favor among the church organizations. Just why the Mayor suddenly decided to enforce the law is not clear. His own explanation that he feared the Anti-Saloon League would have him indicted is hardly satisfactory, in view of his reckless disregard for the civil service law. The truth seems to be that the political advisers back of the administration, former Senator William Lorimer and former Congressman Fred Lundin, thought that the time was ripe for such a move. For the politicians are aware of the revolution in large industry's attitude toward the liquor traffic. At any event, the enforcement of the Sunday closing ordinance was a very shrewd stroke. During the few Sundays when the law was strictly administered, all "dry Chicago" approved. But rigid enforcement did not last long, and the public soon learned that saloon licenses which had been ostentatiously withdrawn were returned quietly to their original owners within a few days.

Then the vice question was reopened, to the administration's discredit. During Carter H. Harrison's last term the segregated vice districts had been abolished. Under the guise of cabarets, however, vice was shown by the Chicago *Herald* to be reëstablished in the old districts during the past winter. To every exposé, Mayor Thompson announced that he had no confidence in "four-flushing reformers." That expression, plus the fiasco of Sunday closing, was sufficient to alienate the great bulk of those who had been first attracted by the dry edict.

So it has been in every particular. The labor organizations which became Thompson adherents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on account of the Mayor's attitude in the street car settlement were made his bitter enemies by his refusal even to meet the representatives of the garment workers and by his attempt to aid in the destruction of the teachers' federation. The business men who had been lured by a ridiculous "prosperity parade," and by the intimation that Chicago would be given an old fashioned "business administration," were humiliated when the Mayor used the names of prominent citizens to "rubber-stamp" the appointment of a cabinet impossible to approve. The Harrison Democrats who swelled the Thompson majority were in part led on by the Mayor's talk of regulating the price of gas. Their ardor was cooled when the administration began to hamper the action of the city council to obtain real regulation, and also when it became known that Mr. Thompson was on July 1, 1914, the record owner of 1,100 shares of Commonwealth Edison stock—the corporation now reputed to control the gas company.

Though the Mayor and his advisors have played to fundamental popular instincts, they have so stupidly misused and betrayed their honest supporters in the effort to create a new machine, that they have shattered their opportunities.

Two episodes will suffice to close the story. The first was the tragedy of Dr. Theodore B. Sachs, head of Chicago's new tuberculosis sanitarium. Dr. Sachs as a young physician began to study tuberculosis in the Hull House region. He first of all convinced his city that the plague was a social disease. Through his effort the voters by a majority of four to one elected to build a great sanitarium. Dr. Sachs was the directing genius of this institution, said to be unsurpassed in the world. For years the physician gave the best of his time to the people and for all his service he never exacted a penny. The leading specialist in the city, he might have earned a fortune in private practise. He died a poor man. Mayor Thompson and his health commissioner, Dr. John Dill Robertson, tried to fill the tuberculosis sanitarium with political job holders. Dr. Sachs stood out against them as long as he could and then resigned. The Mayor forthwith started a campaign of calumny, publicly uttering charges which immediately were proved to be false. In agony Dr. Sachs committed suicide. He left a letter to the public, explaining in language of fine simplicity that the sanitarium had been "conceived to the glory of Chicago." His death went to the heart of all classes of citizens. *En masse* the Jews, once a Lorimer asset, became a hostile force.

Out of the humiliation of Dr. Sachs came a citizen's committee. Out of the destruction of civil service, the violation of the health department, the snubbing of labor and the cabals against the schools came a great meeting of thousands of women. For the first time the women voters, representing all sections and classes, formulated the woman's platform, crystallized the woman's conscience for Chicago. Not even the general impatience with the respectable Republican organization, not even the deep-seated distrust, which so many thousands of good citizens hold toward charitable and reform organizations—a feeling to which Thompson has ever pandered—have been able to save the Mayor. He is now accepted at his own value, a Lorimer politician, unchanged and unchanging, a man unable to speak to a new age in its own terms.

WILLIAM L. CHENERY.

Strauss in the Alps

FOR more than a decade after the production of the "Symphonia Domestica" in 1903 Dr. Richard Strauss turned from the concert hall to the operatic stage; "Salome," "Elektra," "Der Rosenkavalier," "Ariadne auf Naxos," and "Josephs Legende" appeared in turn, each starting a new wave of controversy. It is only recently that with the "Alpensymphonie," first produced October 28th, 1915, in Berlin, under his own direction, he has carried a step further the methods in program music made familiar by his long series of symphonic poems. Naturally there has been keen interest in the American première of this new symphony, which of course presents great difficulties and makes exacting demands. The orchestras of the country entered into something like a race to achieve the "first time in America." The Philharmonic Society of New York was obliged to fall out, on account of the non-arrival of the orchestral parts from Germany. The Cincinnati Orchestra under Dr. Ernst Kunwald and the Philadelphia Orchestra under Mr. Leopold Stokowski may be said to have finished neck and neck, the former producing the new work April 27th, and the latter April 28th and 29th. Both conductors, by the way, led the enormously complicated work from memory.

The Philadelphia performance of Friday, April 28th, was a masterly one, revealing once more the unique gifts of Mr. Stokowski among American conductors. The authority and command of all detail, the large grasp of the emotional and intellectual content of the work as a whole, the fascination of his rhythm, always incisive and yet always elastic, gave his performance real power.

The evocation of night with which the symphony opens is remarkable. The strings, divided into twenty groups, and muted, outline a slowly down-creeping scale, in the somber key of B flat minor, every note of which is held, so that there results

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a strange opaque cloud of tone, literally a musical night. Against this background the trombones sound solemn chords as in a chorale, in harmonies baffling the ear by their strangeness. Horn and trumpet calls, increasing in force and frequency, lead over to a jubilant "sunrise" in brightest A major, effective in color, trivial in melodic quality. After a brief climax, the main theme of the symphony, the theme of the Ascent, is given out by the strings—a square-cut melody of rather heavy rhythmic tread. A striking episode is the sounding of a fanfare of twelve horns, two trumpets and two trombones, off stage, picturing hunting-horns in the wood about to be entered. The section entitled "Entry Into the Wood" continues the burly, heavy style of the Ascent theme, notably inferior in verve, elasticity, and essential melodic life to the Hero theme in "Ein Heldenleben," for example, with which it has something in common. Genuine inspiration comes at last, however, with a broad melodious treatment of the Ascent theme in the violins, in A flat major, a passage simply yet sonorously orchestrated, containing a lovely bit for string quartet of solo instruments alone, answered by a fuller group. This is the Strauss of the love-scene in "Don Juan," the "childhood" episode in "Tod und Verklärung," and many other passages of warm and moving melody.

It is rather trying to pass from it to more scene painting, this time a brook, less watery than Beethoven's in the Pastoral Symphony, indeed one of the least successful pictorial episodes. The waterfall, on the other hand, with springing bow violin figures, and cascades of arpeggios for the more agile woodwind and the celesta, is as silvery as anyone could wish. "In the mountain pasture," even more realistic, introduces us to a flock of real sheep, with real sheep-bells tinkling, yodling calls from the shepherds (?), and funny quickly-repeated oboe notes which we suppose are the baaing of the lambs, or else birds. Never having been in a real Alpine pasture, we were rather bored at this point.

An energetic fugato next suggests scrambles through brambles, from which we at length emerge on the glacier, to a cacophonous but powerfully conceived passage in which many earlier themes are marshalled and combined. "A dangerous moment" is suggested dramatically in tones of bassoons, muted trumpets, and tremolo strings in most imaginative discords. With the final arrival at the summit we have a jubilant restatement of some of the earlier themes (that of sunrise and others less commonplace), and an episode entitled "Vision," in which the composer pushes the trumpets and shriller woodwind instruments to their highest registers in a way that is almost physically painful.

This is the high point of the program; from now on the dramatic tension descends with the imaginary traveler; and it must be confessed that much of the coming up of the mist, the obscuring of the sun, the elegy sung by all the strings to a rather muddy organ accompaniment, seemed on a first hearing merely dull. But the storm was not dull. Of course there had to be a storm, and there is no doubt it reaches the maximum of "frightfulness" yet attained in orchestral storms. One could but pity the hapless mortal who played, or rather worked, the wind-machine. It was even more fun to watch than to listen to this storm, and the audience seemed to enter into the spirit of the occasion.

After the storm there is a section entitled "Ausklang," broadly developed and musically convincing, in the vein of those finely conceived emotional summings-up, or gatherings of the threads, that Strauss so often places at the ends of his symphonic poems. It leads through an impressive progression of organ harmonies back to the key of B flat minor, and with a repetition of the opening section night redescends and the symphony concludes.

A first impression of so complex and long a work as the Alpensymphonie (it lasts fifty minutes, without pause) has of course but a tentative and provisional critical value. It is subject to revision. The elements of it, however, may as well be stated candidly. Although simpler in harmonic style than some of the earlier works, especially the music dramas, the symphony is by no means free from their sensationalism. It aims to titillate or to overpower the physical ear rather than to delight the mind or to purge the spirit. It heaps up means with all the frank materialism of the modern school, believes in force rather than in persuasion or beauty, entirely lacks reticence, exaggerates sentiment into sentimentality, and mistakes crude energy for enlightened will. It subordinates the generalized emotional expression which is the peculiar gift of music to highly detailed pictorial suggestion —"tone-painting"—carried out oftentimes with a childish literalness that reminds one of the squalling baby in the "Domestica" or the sheep in "Don Quixote." Many of its themes are musically commonplace, with a swaggering complacency sometimes hard to bear, and there is little development of them, which would indeed be out of place in a scheme so frankly subordinating intellectual and spiritual to sensuous interest. Yet in spite of all this, there is remarkable graphic power in some of the musical pictures, especially night, the waterfall, and the "dangerous moment" on the glacier, there are a few passages of noble music, and there is as in everything Strauss writes the technical and intellectual grasp of the master.

DANIEL GREGORY MASON.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The President or His Party

"SOMETIMES," wrote Woodrow Wilson six years ago, "the country believes in a party, but more often it believes in a man." This was emphatically so in the second election of Mr. Cleveland and was the explanation of the overwhelming majority given Mr. Roosevelt in 1904. A like condition is arising in the present campaign to reëlect Mr. Wilson. Moorfield Storey concludes a recent review of Wilson's administration with the query, "Whom can we trust more safely?"

Yet there *is* a party, and, even though at times it has been willing to be considered the "President's party," the name and the ticket this fall will be "Democratic party." As such it will present candidates in each congressional district and in eighteen states it will strive to elect Democratic Senators. These candidates will, with rare exceptions, "stand by Wilson," yet they are necessarily, again with rare exceptions, Democrats first and Wilson men second. Those who succeed in reaching Congress will determine in large measure the nature of Mr. Wilson's second administration, if he is reëlected. As it is impossible for the nation to judge of these candidates individually, it is necessary to judge them together, as Democrats. At the present time we cannot judge them, if we cared to, by platform pledges, or by addresses or appeals they may make to the voters during the campaign. But the record of the Democratic majorities in this and the preceding Congress are open to us. It is natural to expect to judge the party by the performances of its representatives of such recent date.

Unquestionably this record should be examined, yet much of it relates to matters that are not to be of importance in the coming campaign. To judge the party on its performances with reference to domestic issues would seem just, but when attention is to be confined to matters relating to our foreign relations, it might be thought advisable to ignore, at least temporarily, the uncertainty and sluggishness of the present Congress and to take a much longer view of the Democratic party as an agency in the national government.

Parties are made up of men, and parties, as men, are affected by environment and experience. The Democrats who are in control of the party at the present time were not politically inexperienced prior to 1912. Presumably most of them had had for some time an interest in their party before they entered national public life. Woodrow Wilson, although a man of twenty in 1876, doubtless took an absorbing interest in the Hayes-Tilden contest of that year. One-fifth of the present Democratic membership of the Senate were able to vote in that contest. The same is true of twenty-three Democrats of the present House. By 1880 one-half of the present Democratic membership in the Senate were of voting age. Not until 1892 were one-half of the present House of age. We may conclude that a decided majority of the Democrats now in national public life have been party to the past quarter century of Democratic history, and have been influenced by the Democratic position for perhaps twice as long.

The Democratic party of to-day, as distinct from its ante-reconstruction predecessor, spans that period of fifty years, for it came into being in the congressional elections of 1866. For a decade as an impotent faction it inveighed against the reconstruction policies of the Republican majorities, expressed "cordial sympathy" with the workingmen of the United States, and incurred a reputation for playing with repudiation by its questionable attitude upon the retirement of greenbacks and the payment of the national debt.

In 1876 the party turned to "reform" as a battle-cry with which to drown out the charge of "rebellion." In nominating Samuel J. Tilden, the "reform governor of New York," it entered upon a period of forty years in which this cry has been the outstanding characteristic of the party. It has won in this period ten congressional elections and thus controlled the House of Representatives for twenty years. It has been less fortunate in the Senate, securing control only three times and constituting a majority for eight years. Popular approval has been given its presidential candidate in four elections. At the close of two its candidates were not seated, Tilden losing before the Electoral Commission in 1877 and Cleveland failing of an electoral majority in 1888. The party elected and inaugurated one man, Grover Cleveland, at the close of the campaigns of 1884 and 1892. Woodrow Wilson secured the support of the party in 1912, but takes his place with the younger Adams and with Lincoln as a minority president. Four Democrats have risen to the task of national leadership in forty years; two "reform" governors of New York, succeeded by a "reform" ex-congressman from Nebraska who, after sixteen years of conspicuous endeavor, relinquished first leadership to the "reform" governor of New Jersey.

The record of the party in office has been brief,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much more so than the preceding survey would indicate. In 1878, when it captured control of the Senate for the first time in twenty years, it already had a majority in the House of Representatives, but the Republican Hayes was President. The Democratic majorities in the Forty-sixth Congress attempted to over-ride the President, and although they repeatedly failed to do so, the spectacle of the Democracy using extreme methods to work its will injured the party in quarters where it had gained support since 1874. Not until 1885 did a Democrat occupy the White House, and although Cleveland had the support of a Democratic House throughout his term, the Senate was Republican, thus blocking Democratic action. But in 1893 when Cleveland came a second time to the Presidency, he was greeted by Democratic majorities in both houses. For the first and only time in sixty years a majority of the electorate had expressed its faith in the Democratic party in such a way as to give it absolute control. The ensuing two years are years of Democratic responsibility, but in lieu of Democratic legislation there followed division, disaster, and defeat. Cleveland finished his term devoid of a party.

From the inauguration of William McKinley in 1897 to the meeting of the Sixty-second Congress in 1911, the Democratic party was at no time in control of any branch of the government. Many explanations have been offered for the impotency of the party, but no commentary is so significant as is a summary given by Cleveland of his work. In indicating what, in his opinion, were the achievements of his eight years in office, he failed to mention tariff reform or civil service reform. He might have said that possible reasons for their exclusion rested not in lack of his action upon these points, but in the presence of adverse action by elements within the Democratic party. Cleveland cited three outstanding events: his action in using federal troops at the time of the Chicago strike; his effort to preserve the gold standard; and his attitude in the Venezuela controversy. All mark Cleveland as a forceful man, but do no credit to the Democratic party, for in none did he represent the party and in none was he followed by it.

It will be said that it is unfair and unnecessary to bring up past failures and mistakes; in particular that Woodrow Wilson has succeeded where his predecessors in the party failed. In spite of the quite obvious fact that political memories are not short, efforts have for some time been directed to giving entire attention to the past six years of Democratic party history. So much has been said that little need be said here. Instead of this, it may be well to emphasize the weakness of such an appeal.

It is true that the Democratic leader has administered the government unchecked by opposition control of either house of Congress for a longer period than any Democrat since Franklin Pierce, and more absolutely than any since Andrew Jackson. No Democrat since Thomas Jefferson, not even Jackson in his second term, has been in such a position to shape party policy as has Woodrow Wilson. It is, perhaps, no wonder that his administration has promised to open a new epoch in Democratic history, and that no serious question has been raised of his leadership in the campaign of this year. Yet this seeming strength covers a quite different condition. Woodrow Wilson became President and had supporting majorities in Congress only because of a serious disagreement in the opposition. In 1912, in having the support of a minority of the electorate, he had less support than Bryan in any one of his campaigns, polling a smaller percentage of the total vote cast than any Democratic candidate since the Civil War. He retained control in the congressional elections of 1914 for the same reasons, although his majorities were cut down and in the by-elections of 1915 the reversion to the two-party system is seen to be complete, with the Democracy occupying the same relative minority position it has occupied in the last twenty years.

Democratic leaders enter upon this campaign under the unfamiliar necessity of defending a record in office, a record in domestic and foreign affairs for which there has been as yet no mandate from the people. They are attacked by a party whose leaders have been long accustomed to power and who are animated by a consciousness that a majority of the people have been with them, and by all statistical tests are Republican at the present time.

During the period of immediate preparation for this campaign, the Democrats have occupied the position favorable to determine action. The Republicans have been sadly conscious of this in their search for a candidate. Yet, it is the Republican party that in the past two decades has gone on record in favor of an aggressive foreign policy as it has become conscious of the widening horizon of the American people. John Hay caught and emphasized the larger vision. The Democratic party under the dominance of Middle-Western leadership has repeatedly thrown itself across the path of a larger leadership. This legacy of provincialism has rested heavily upon the Democratic party in the past six years of office. After twenty years of opposition, with eyes turned in upon domestic problems, members were slow to adapt themselves to conditions forced upon them by warfare in Mexico and in Europe. Woodrow Wilson, by temperament and absence of experience in office or in active opposition, has been less bound than his party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The President has recently said: "You never can tell your direction except by long measurements. You cannot establish a line by two posts; you have got to have three at least to know whether they are straight with anything, and the longer your line the more certain your measurements. There is only one way in which to determine how the future of the United States is going to be projected and that is by looking back and seeing which way the lines ran which led up to the present moment of power and opportunity." While disclaiming that an examination of the past is the *only* way of projecting the future, we may yet feel that in pointing out the way that led up to the present hour of power and opportunity for the Democratic party we have shed light upon the question of its present potentialities. Perhaps it would be sufficiently enlightening to take three "posts," the declarations and elections of 1908, 1904, and 1900, although "the line" would be far from straight. It would furnish a fairer basis for judgment to pass in review a half century of the party's history. Woodrow Wilson has yet to lead the New Democracy to its first victory.

EDGAR E. ROBINSON.

A COMMUNICATION

The Duty of German-Americans

SIR: The German-Americans have lately been given the benefit of a good deal of generous advice, particularly from that part of the press which is most extreme in partisanship for the cause of the Allies. They have been given to understand that this is the time for them to manifest unequivocally their loyalty to the government of the United States. They are to disavow in a body the sinister machinations of German spies, strike agents, and dynamiters. They are to condemn collectively the methods of German submarine warfare and thereby exert a wholesome pressure upon the militarist party in Germany. They are to proclaim *en masse* their unconditional adherence to the principles laid down in President Wilson's recent message to Congress.

It seems to me, such demands of conduct addressed to a particular class of American citizens are just as objectionable, and just as foreign to the spirit of true Americanism, as would be the demands for special rights raised by this particular class itself. It is of the very essence of American public life that every citizen fulfill his political obligations as far as he possibly can without the bias of racial affiliations; and every appeal to groups of citizens based upon their racial affiliations, even if this appeal is made for the purpose of pledging such a group to a supposed special national duty, is subversive of the very foundations of American life. The German-American has no duties different from those of any other American.

The demand that German-Americans come out at this particular time with eager protestations of loyalty to the government of the United States is tantamount to the assumption that their conduct has given ground for suspecting their loyalty. This is a wholly unwarranted and mischievous assumption. That the German-Americans, almost to a man, ardently sympathize with the cause of Germany in her present hour of distress and her unprecedentedly heroic resistance against a world in arms, is natural and legitimate. It is only the counterpart of the equally eager sympathy displayed by Anglo-Americans for the British side. In the face of a most fanatic campaign of slander and vilification directed against everything that the German nation has stood for during the last hundred years, German-Americans on the whole have preserved commendable calmness and moderation. Their allegiance to the principles of American political institutions has remained wholly unaffected thereby, and needs no reaffirmation.

The activity of German spies, strike agents, and dynamiters in this country in so far as it exists outside of the imagination of excited journalists has largely been brought about by the fact that the British fleet has penned up thousands of German reservists within our borders and prevented them from fighting with their regiments in Europe. Every American must deplore and condemn the secret plottings on neutral territory by these deluded persons. The demand that German-Americans should disavow them implies the wholly unwarranted accusation of complicity with them. The German-Americans have no duty of conduct with regard to them which is not identical with that of every other American.

The demand that German-Americans should, as a body, pledge themselves unconditionally to the principles laid down by President Wilson in his message on submarine warfare and thereby give him a particularly effective support in his controversy with the German government, is an attempt to force a particular class of American citizens into an attitude toward our foreign affairs which seems to me incompatible with the American conception of liberty. No American, of whatever racial antecedents, can help being grieved and shocked at the fearful loss of life among noncombatants which the submarine warfare has wrought. No American, of whatever racial antecedents, can fail to sympathize deeply with the President's endeavor to bring this ferocious warfare to an end. But one may be a good American and yet venture to think that the particular way in which the President has attacked this problem has been unfortunate. One may be a good American and yet believe that it would have been better if the President, instead of putting the whole blame for this ferocious warfare upon Germany, had held both England and Germany to account for it. One may be a good American and yet hope that the President will still see a way to act successfully as mediator between the palpably inhuman methods of German submarine destruction and the more insidiously inhuman methods of English naval strangulation. At any rate, in this matter as in all others, the German-Americans

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have no duties which they do not share with all other American citizens, and they should have the same right of criticism which is accorded to others. There is not the slightest reason for thinking that they will not as loyally as any other part of the American people stand by whatever decision Congress may ultimately reach in this momentous matter.

I can think only of one paramount duty for the German-American at the present moment; but this duty, also, he has in common with all his compatriots. That duty is: to do everything in his power to prevent the United States from being engulfed in the European catastrophe. The only hope for civilization left in these abysmal days is the continued peace and the undisturbed development of free America. That hope, also, would be gone if through blind partisanship we allowed ourselves to be drawn into this fratricidal conflict of nations from which we ourselves have sprung.

KUNO FRANCKE.

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

[Note: This communication from Professor Francke was contributed in response to a request from THE NEW REPUBLIC for a statement representing the position of those German-Americans whose loyalty to their adopted country is unquestioned.—THE EDITORS.]

CORRESPONDENCE

Different Kinds of War

SIR: I have followed with much interest the correspondence between Mr. Norman Angell and Mr. Ralph Barton Perry, because the question whether it is possible by universal military service to increase our sense of patriotic responsibility without loss of moral and intellectual freedom is one of the most important and pressing that we can consider. I should like to agree with Mr. Perry, because I am so warmly in sympathy with him, but I cannot help feeling that when he says, "The suppression of individuality involved in war itself . . . has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of universal service," because "it is absolutely necessary, once battle is joined, that men should suppress their private differences and act loyally in the common service," he is overlooking a very important point.

There are wars, and wars. It is perhaps the deepest tragedy of the present situation that whoever was the aggressor at the beginning of the great war, *all* the principal nations engaged in it are now fighting for their existence, and it has therefore become the absolute duty of every one of their citizens to give his services, and if necessary his life, for his country. But all wars are not of this sort. Of the five which the United States has fought, only the Revolutionary and the Civil Wars involved the national existence. Each of the others—those with Spain and Mexico and the War of 1812—was not only of minor importance, but was held by large numbers of our most responsible and conscientious citizens to be unnecessary and wrong. Suppose a young man who felt as Charles Eliot Norton did about the Spanish War, or as James Russell Lowell did about the Mexican, obliged under conscription to risk his own life and take that of others because a majority—perhaps a very small majority—in Congress had voted (as it did in 1846) to invade and plunder a helpless neighbor. Better, a hundred times better, even our present lamentable and chaotic condition than such citizenship—such slavery—as that!

L. W. HOPKINSON.

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Give Us Philosophers!

SIR: In the program of national preparedness, to which President Wilson's recent note gives the likelihood of introducing a real performance, what planning or consideration is devoted to philosophy? Serious as the matter is, I doubt if we have bestowed upon it even a frivolous thought—hence this letter. When we observe the yeomen's service rendered by such thinkers as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Carlyle, and others, we realize that their benefits are three-fold. They give the enemy a clue to your national psychology; and, as the clue is false, the psychology remains a deep state secret. Needless to say, one false impression is worth a hundred regiments. God fights on the side of the heaviest *masked* batteries. Koenigsberg is more important than Plattsburg. Secondly, a good, hard-working, efficient philosopher lightens remarkably the task of the future historians, who will employ him as a *deus ex machina,* and will save irksome toil in endeavoring to discover the true causes of things. A hundred years from now, our only life will be that which the historians grant us; and they will be in no humor to provide us with commodious tombs if, inconsiderately and shortsightedly, we do not provide them with philosophers. Finally, ornamental at all times, in wartime philosophers add to this æsthetic quality a beauty of holiness which will be found to justify our most questionable aims, our boldest courses, our weakest moments. They act as the confirming judgment of Philip sober—or drunk, it matters little.

Although it is easy to see that no national preparedness should be without one, it is difficult to decide which American sage can best fill our military needs. To tell the truth, we are a trifle shy on philosophers. Dialecticians, epistemologists, logicians, and psychologists we have by the score; but, although they be deeper than wells, they will not serve. And the worst of it is that a philosopher, "guide and friend" in our most need, cannot be secured by authorization of Congress, decree of Senate, purchase of railroads, credit-loan of banks, or coöperation of labor unions. Of slow, delicate growth, they require tender and painstaking nurture. Like poets, they must be born.

An inventory reveals our meagre stock. Mr. Dewey, pragmatic and accordingly adaptable, plainly lacks bloodthirstiness. He believes slate-pencils are mightier than swords. Mr. Perry, grim realist and all that, betrays an indecisiveness—I could hardly gather from his recent article on Universal Service whether he was for grape-shot or for grape-juice. Mr. Royce, with his "great community" might do to fill a breach, but the suspicious German trademark, the odor of Hegel, that attaches itself to all absolute idealism, must give us pause. Mr. E. B. Holt looks promising, he talks much on integration; but he suffers immeasurably for our purpose, as do all contemporaries, in that he is not dead.

Truly there is little use fortifying waste-places, in creating armies, paper, wooden, or otherwise, in bringing Daniels to judgment; for, if we have not philosophy, we are as the Pacificists.

MARVIN M. LOWENTHAL.

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books and Things

NOT many months ago, when the plan was only a plan, timid persons went about wringing their hands and asking if nothing could be done to call the whole thing off. Not even Shakespeare, they said, could go through such a furnace of comment and come out unsinged. "Just think," they said, "of the tributes to his memory! Think how often people will declare that Shakespeare is the greatest name in all literature! Think of the reasons given by men and women who cannot read a page of Xenophon for rating him higher than any of the Greek poets! Do the Germans concur in the opinion that Shakespeare is the greatest name in all literature? Some of them do and some don't. Do the Russians? We haven't the slightest idea. Do the French? No. If this celebration comes off as scheduled nobody in the United States will want ever to hear the word Shakespeare again."

Well, the celebration has come and a good deal of it has gone. All but one of the timid persons' predictions have been fulfilled. Strange things have been said about Shakespeare. By the Speaker of the House of Representatives: "I read Shakespeare's plays a great deal. When I go on a trip I usually take one or two of them in my valise." By the Vice-President of the United States: "Whoever will take his morals from the Four Gospels and his philosophy from the Bard . . . " and so forth. By the Rev. John Haynes Holmes: "I can scarcely remember a time when I did not know Shakespeare. . . . The Bard is not the 'chosen and loved companion of many a leisure hour,' for the simple reason that I have no such hours! . . . And then, years hence, when work no longer presses, and I have some leisure hours for literary comradeship, I shall be surprised if I do not seek again the pages of the great Elizabethan." By Mr. Mark Sullivan, editor of *Collier's Weekly:* "Two things that I have frequently said in the past are these: . . . Second, on an occasion some four years ago when I saw Beerbohm Tree's production of Henry VIII in His Majesty's Theatre, with the music by German, I said I did not suppose a mature man could possibly get so much pleasure out of illusion as I got out of that occasion."

You may infer that these remarks were chosen in malice. Not exactly. They all come from one issue of one newspaper, which was the first my hand happened to find, and in which many things are said about Shakespeare by men eminent themselves or perched on an eminence. Several of the things said were wise. If I have quoted only the foolish things I have done so not in malice, but only to illustrate the great truth that Shakespeare can stand more and worse celebrating than any other English writer. The tumult and the shouting is forgiven because it has died, and died without doing Shakespeare any harm.

And in making these selections I have had the help of another and a better principle of choice.

Less than two thousand lines and fragments of lines—until the end of the nineteenth century this was all that the modern world knew of Menander at first hand, yet clear pictures existed of what we had lost by not knowing him better. A reputation he did not quite win while living came to him after death, and out of these few fragments, and out of things said about him by later ancients, the moderns built his praise. For the moment it does not matter that recent discoveries of longer passages have abated his glory. What matters for the moment is the Menander legend as it used to be, as it was when George Meredith said that "Terence shares with his master the praise of an amenity that is like Elysian speech, equable and ever gracious"; as the legend was when Robert Bridges told us his hours of winter in the country:

> Then oft I turn the page
> In which our country's name,
> Spoiling the Greek of fame,
> Shall sound in every age:
> Or some Terentian play
> Renew, whose excellent
> Adjusted folds betray
> How once Menander went.

Such words have moved me to regret the loss of plays which I shall never know how to read in Menander's language! His lines taught us to imagine him as a poet who could put even his maxim-making gift in its place, as the idea which pure comedy should try to satisfy, as a more shining Molière, with a happier mastery than Terence's over words and their music.

Menander said that Sappho threw herself from the far-seen rocks of the Leucadian headland, but we do not know whether the legend is true, or whether she was buried in good earth. We believe her to have been a dark woman, we remember that she was violet-weaving, sweet-smiling Sappho to Alcaeus, that Meleager wove into his garland "of Sappho little, but all roses," that even she, for all her aspiration, did not think to touch the sky with her two hands. Much less of her poetry survives than of Menander's, yet no fame founded on hearsay and so few fragments, on one or two whole poems, is so clear as hers. With the names the Greeks gave her, the nursling of Persuasion, the tenth Muse, the flower of the Graces, she has come down to us as an ideal, a perfection, the most perfect among the passionate poets of love.

Less clear than our picture of Sappho, or than the nineteenth century's picture of Menander, would be our posterity's picture of Shakespeare, if all of him were lost but a few fragments. Posterity would get the most contradictory notions of him from Hazlitt and Charles Lamb, Goethe and Heine, Tolstoi and Bernard Shaw and Frank Harris. But one thing it could not help getting, a solid belief in his size and many-sidedness, a belief not to be shaken by the survival even of such things as I have quoted from Vice-President Marshall and Mr. Mark Sullivan. On the contrary, posterity might wonder the more at the remarkableness of a poet who brought to the speaking-point men so plainly without aptitude for this kind of speech. It was with this in mind that I chose my extracts so wisely.

Once upon a time a traveler, coming down from the inland country to a city by the sea, found the inhabitants excited by a call from a ship that no two of them described alike. Evidence conflicted as to her rig and speed and tonnage, and agreed only in saying that nothing so huge and swift had ever called at that or any other port. The traveller listened, and then climbed a seaward-looking hill, staring up the long sea and down the long sky, hoping for a glimpse at least of the vanished ship's high spars, though all the rest of her were already down, nothing but a legend, not even a memory.

P. L.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

War—the Way Out

The European Anarchy, by G. Lowes Dickinson. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.00.

IN civil life when a man calls you a drunkard you do not shoot him. You sue him for libel. You are sufficiently Chinafied to let some out-of-the-way judge pass on the question of your personal virtue, and you feel completely vindicated if you secure a favorable verdict and indemnity to the amount of a postage-stamp. It is idle, therefore, to say honor cannot be arbitrated. It is only legitimate to say that in the absence of the machinery of arbitration a miserable difficulty exists.

At this moment many Americans are ready to contemplate war with Germany. It is only a small minority, however, who are talking of honor. Most of those who contemplate war put it on the basis of actual injury. They feel this country has suffered hideous damage and provocation. They feel it cannot tolerate further transgression. They believe it is incumbent on us to join forces with the preponderant Powers of Europe to punish and regulate an enemy which has defied our own and European rights.

In the midst of this crisis it is well to take counsel with sane men whose own governments have already undertaken the business of punishment and regulation. One of the sanest of these men is G. Lowes Dickinson, and one of the sanest of his utterances is "The European Anarchy," a book that can be purchased for a dollar and read and digested in less than three hours.

The chief point that Mr. Dickinson argues is that international damages, transgressions, provocations and the rest do not arise from any particular wickedness in any particular nation. They arise from a condition of international disorder that all great modern states, caring for power and wealth, have permitted to exist, turning the disorder, if possible, to their own advantage; and these disputes are incapable of satisfactory settlement by the mere process of conflict under arms. What is required is a body of law that converts international disorder into order. To put armaments behind that law is a necessity for securing enforcement. Then "the nations must submit to law and to right in the settlement of their disputes."

It is not apparent to many Americans that self-interest figures in their present attitude toward Germany. They simply feel righteously indignant. But the basic fact, of course, is that the *status quo* in the world at large is threatened by Germany, and many thoughtful Americans subconsciously fear that our future may be at stake. They prefer a balance of power to a greatly aggrandized bellicose empire. They fear Germany greatly aggrandized. They think it important, as England does, to punish an aggressive Germany. It is not that they put punishment above civilization. It is that they cannot contemplate with equanimity Germany's terrific assault on the *status quo*.

Why the Germans should be content to accept that *status quo,* with the British dominant on the seas, Mr. Dickinson does not argue. Nor does he discuss at length by what process under international law the appetite for power and wealth and the factor of competition can be reasonably arranged for and satisfied. This seems to me the real difficulty. But what he does demonstrate is how the Machiavellianism of modern diplomacy, the appeal to passions and imbecilities, has utterly failed to accommodate that appetite; and his greatest service is to acknowledge how England and France and Russia, as well as Germany and Austria, have failed to live by a decent international ideal or to be reasonable about new claims.

The classes that are opposed to those new claims that arise by reason of political and economic evolution are to be discovered in every country, including America. And much of the sentiment for "preparedness" emanates from such classes, not from persons who are solicitous of a public law. The incident of an injury with such classes is no argument in their minds for legal adjustment of international relations. It is an argument for high self-assertion. And Mr. Dickinson indicates that every nation, under the present anarchy, has had to endure grievances and injuries of various kinds.

After the Morocco crisis, in which Germany felt it had been deceived and outraged, M. Georges Bourdon went to Germany for the *Figaro* to look over the ground. He found that the bulk of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific, but he discovered a large clique shouting for "preparedness." These were mainly the Pan-Germans. He described them as "exasperated, wretched windbags." "They have the yellow skin, the dry mouth, the green complexion of the bilious. They do not live under the sky, they avoid the light. Hidden in their cellars, they pour over treaties, cite newspaper articles, grow pale over maps, measure angles, quibble over texts or traces of frontiers."

At a moment when America feels itself to be deceived and outraged, when the bulk of opinion is still strongly pacific, it remains to be decided whether our "preparedness" people are exasperated jingoes, stirred to fever by the same sort of green and yellow bug that excited the war spirit in Germany.

Here is the jingoistic class M. Bourdon found in Germany: "It was composed largely of soldiers, both active and retired; the latter especially looking with envy and disgust on the increasing prosperity of the commercial classes, and holding that a 'blood-letting would be wholesome to purge and regenerate the social body'—a view not confined to Germany and one which has received classical expression in Tennyson's 'Maud.' To this movement belonged also the high officials, the Conservative parties, patriots and journalists, and of course the armament firms, deliberate fomenters of war in Germany, as everywhere else, in order to put money into their pockets. To these must be added 'the intellectual flower of the universities and the schools.'"

It does not follow from this that Mr. Dickinson takes an indulgent attitude toward the aggressiveness of Germany. He shows how Germany resisted the limitation of armaments and manipulated for the present trial by battle. But in the ultimate causes he thinks all the states at war were implicated, and he disputes with full conviction "the view which seems to be almost universally held in England, that Germany had been pursuing for years past a policy of war, while all the other Powers had been pursuing a policy of peace."

Mr. Dickinson differs from many Americans in his final outlook. He seems to have no faith whatever in the proximate value of a new and better balance of power. Is America's participation in this war the way to bring about a machinery of justice which all nations, including Germany, will accept? It is this new kind of decision, based on something very different from French indignation over Alsace, British indignation over Belgium, German indignation over Morocco, American indignation over the Lusitania, that Mr. Dickinson seeks to stimulate by his humane and conscientious research.

F. H.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An American Feminist

Julia Ward Howe, 1819-1910, by Laura E. Richards and Maude Howe Elliott. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $5.00.

EVERY now and then, in talking, have we not all of us a sudden excited sense of having put into words some idea, some sensibility, with an accuracy and an adequacy that seem perfect, miraculous! And it is at such times that we get for response an "I know what you mean," along with an indulgent, helpful laugh. We want of course to hiss, "But I've just *said* what I mean!" In a little while, however, we regain our pleasantness, unless it was a contemporary who proclaimed himself so good a guesser. Between contemporaries there should be a common idiom—that's surely a "vital illusion."

In reading the diary and letters of the last generation but one, we find ourselves often on the point of making just that irritating response. It needs such cordiality to penetrate behind their phrases. Their way of assured generalization is not our way of thought; their moral and religious forms of speech strike us as vague and imperfectly realized. But what carries us through the two volumes of Mrs. Howe's Life and Letters is the number of times we do understand her instantly—her extraordinary vitality, her wit, her great heart so enliven the idiom of her generation.

Her completeness as a woman is what perhaps more than anything else makes us listen to her with that "romantic sympathy" she herself felt was needed by Emerson. She was an imaginative and devoted wife, able to efface herself when she chose; she bore six children and seemed supreme and life-giving to them till her death; she was a woman of the world, kindly, simple, in the best tradition; she had the grace of admirable fooling; she was a tireless and eager student. When such a woman, whose energies might be exhausted delightfully in her private life, chooses to enter public life, the cries about woman's sphere lose force. That vital power should remain in her for public service must be because of some deep-rooted sense of solidarity, some persistent desire for larger growth. When she was twenty-eight, she called herself "a pilgrim in pursuit of something that is neither house nor lands, nor children, nor health"—all good things, by the way, that she had. "What that something is I scarce know. Sometimes it seems to me one thing and sometimes another. Oh, immortality, thou art to us but a painful rapture, an ecstatic burthen in this earthly life." It is hard, of course, sometimes not to make that rejoinder. Playfulness so steps lightly and is gone.

As "the pretty blue stocking, Miss Julia Ward," who, "they say, dreams in Italian and quotes French verses," she had a girlhood of many suitors and of pleasant occupations with the arts. Her four languages and her music and her verses we can imagine as adventurous; she studied harder than was the fashion. When she was twenty-four, she married Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, who had fought in the Greek War of Independence, and whose good looks had a romantic quality. Also he was forty-one years old and had been for nine years director of the Perkins Institution for the Blind. After a summer in London with him, and a winter in Rome, after much exhilarating use of her sense for society, Julia Ward Howe went to live in this Institution, two miles outside of Boston. Here she found her husband accustomed to rule and absorbed in his work, while she had babies and household cares and not much money. Yet here she seems to have kept always, perhaps largely to have created, her feeling for him as "the man of lion-mood," "a bolt of fire." Her verses to him have the Byronic fashion, but their essence is the deep experience of a loving woman—the clear sight that is yet romantic.

Indeed, in these early years of her marriage, spent close to the Institution, she seems always to be realizing and studying her experiences, with on the whole an effect of pleasure. She can seem hard, at times, with that hardness which depends on really enjoying the free play of the mind. She writes to her young sister about to marry: "Marriage, like death, is a debt we owe to nature, and though it costs us something to pay it, yet are we more content and better *established* in peace, when we have paid it."

Free activity for her intelligence became more and more her great need—what she consciously fought for. Since she was lucky enough to have her heart satisfied abundantly, she could be aware of her mind with splendid pride. She could dare express restlessness and dissatisfaction. She could dare disengage the whole real woman.

It was during the Civil War that she definitely became a public figure. It was then her study of German philosophy and of St. Paul made her feel qualified for "ethical exposition." "I determined that I could only be good in fulfilling my highest functions—all else implies waste of power, leading to demoralization." She speaks of her real suffering when she had to be silent at a Unitarian Convention. "I feel that a woman's whole moral responsibility is lowered by the fact that she must never obey a transcendent command of conscience. Man can give her nothing to take the place of this. It is the *divine* right of the human soul." In the face of much family remonstrance, she began giving "philosophical readings" in friends' houses, in Boston and Washington and New York. She was about forty-seven and was aware that she was making use of all she had thought and learned. One gets glimpses of how much she enjoyed this expansion,—as when she quotes two of her witticisms, because "they interested me, opening to myself little shades of thought not perceived before."

Such desire as hers for activity was remarkably prevalent after the Civil War, when women had grown used to working on committees and commissions, and many women's clubs were founded to occupy this unrest. Mrs. Howe, who helped form several, long afterward declared they had given her her faith in woman's power to develop. "Like so many others, I saw the cruel wrongs and vexed problems of our social life, but I did not know that hidden away in its midst was a reserve force destined to give precious aid in the righting of wrongs, and in the solution of discord." The war of 1870 roused her to use all organizations of women in a Peace Movement, and she addressed an appeal that reads like one of to-day, "to Womanhood Throughout the World." She became president of the American Branch of the Woman's International Peace Association, and spoke at many meetings in America and England. A bit of wisdom she owes to such activity is: "The special faults of women are those incidental to a class that has never been allowed to work out its ideal."

When men and women who had worked for the freedom and the civil rights of the Negro formed the New England Woman's Suffrage Association, she became its first president. She had seen, she writes, a "new domain," that of "true womanhood, woman no longer in her ancillary relation to man, but in direct relation to the divine plan and purpose, as a free agent fully sharing with man every human right and every human responsibility." Do we hear ourselves laughing helpfully, "I know what you mean"?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When, however, she gives what is her most vital testimony to the value of the woman's movement, she speaks our language. She had always felt, she says, "a sense of isolation and eccentricity" until she worked in the suffrage organization. When she was over eighty she put it: "In my own youth women were isolated from each other by the very intensity of their personal consciousness. I thought of myself and of other women in this way. We thought that superior women ought to have been born men." That the traditional way of being a pleasing woman is paid for by an isolating personal consciousness, is perhaps a point taken bravely even by so triumphant and joyous a human being as Mrs. Howe.

Eternal youth and hopefulness invigorate and fortify in any manifestation, of course, but Mrs. Howe just happens to cheer her sex rather particularly. When at eighty-nine she cries, like Hokusai: "Oh, my dear, I am beginning to realize at last that I shall never write my book now, my Magnum Opus, that was to be so great!" She cheers us up. That such spirit is due to a reckless expenditure of all sorts of energy, makes more for feminism than her arguments, which usually strike us now as conventional.

When she puts into words, however, what is really her first-hand intimate knowledge of life, she always writes with force. The year before she died, for instance, she made this direct and significant statement: "I do not desire ecstatic disembodied sainthood, because I do not wish to abdicate any one of the attributes of my humanity. I cherish even the infirmities that bind me to my kind. I would be human, and American, and a woman. Paul of Tarsus had one or two ecstacies, but I feel sure that he lived in his humanity strenuously and energetically."

Perhaps the best of her "really available gifts," she wrote on her ninety-first birthday, "was a feeling of what I may call 'the sense of the moment'." Is it not this present-mindedness of hers, alert, vigorous, realistic—and passionate—that has survived its occasions and given her a quality of life denied often to reformers?

E. B.

Guiding the City

City Planning, edited by John Nolen. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $2.00.

THE phrase "city plan" brings too easily to the mind an image of stately white buildings in the most severe Greek style radiating in magnificent lines from a community center. The image says so impressively, "Behold! I create a new heaven and a new earth!" The plain citizen can scarcely be blamed if he does not envisage the stages by which the old heaven and the old earth are to pass away, and so lets the design so carefully prepared for him remain on paper as the expression of some distinguished architect's classical rage. But Mr. Frederick Law Olmsted's introduction to this book ought to lay forever this popular superstition that the art and science of town-planning is to mean nothing more in America than the elaboration of a beautiful but impossibly costly picture of the New Jerusalem.

Actually those days which threatened to keep city-planning in America a mere architectural hobby are already past. Our large cities, many of them, have comprehensive schemes under way for exerting that "well-considered control on behalf of the people of a city over the development of their physical environment as a whole" which is the real philosophy of the city plan. Mr. Nolen's symposium is notable because it gives a sense, as no other book has given us, of the intricacy of the city-planning enterprise, and the number of diverse techniques and arts which it calls upon in coöperation. Seventeen writers, representing the professions of landscape design, law, engineering, architecture, housing reform, civic design, municipal administration, contribute papers which are careful analyses of the different aspects of the problem. All are engaged in a practical or advisory capacity in actual city-planning work, and their biographies make up what is really a history of the city-planning movement for the last ten or fifteen years.

All the writers have that conception of the city which should be at the back of every citizen's mind. They see the city as a complex social organism, for the making and marring of whose future the present generation has a collective responsibility. The field is so vast, the possible effects of each action taken by the private property owner or the municipal administration so limitless, that it is only by the deliberate fusing of all the technical skill available in engineering, sanitation, finance, and civic art, that policies can be worked out which will insure the welfare of the future city. How land shall be subdivided; how highways and minor streets shall be laid out so as to insure the freest circulation of traffic and the least burden of cost to the land; how the heights of buildings shall be regulated so that air and light will not be monopolized; how public buildings, neighborhood centers, parks and playgrounds shall be placed where the public cannot evade using them; how terminal and dock facilities shall be utilized; how street railways shall make for rapid transit and the relief of urban congestion; how the city may be zoned

TIFFANY & CO.

CHINA AND GLASSWARE
LATEST IMPORTATIONS

FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in order to protect residential neighborhoods from the invasion of industry, and insure for industry the most economical rail and water communications; how the public interest and the large social scheme may prevail without violating the rights of individuals:—these are the problems of the city plan which challenge a new intelligence and a new æsthetics.

City-planning is one of the most fruitful courses we have yet found for social education. In the face of it, the citizen has to begin talking a new language. The old familiar antitheses between individual rights and the claims of society, in which every advantage the community as a whole gained was thought of as a sum of little surrenders of individual rights, begin to fade out. The new attitudes gained here may well extend into every field. We may be demanding—and city-planning does demand—a higher level of executive capacity, imagination and coöperating technical skill than we have been content with in the past.

Merely to adopt city-planning as a permanent municipal policy is to set a new social norm. It will not take long to see in city-planning the cardinal municipal policy. To any such general consciousness the law and courts would soon respond. "Rights" that nobody wishes maintained are not likely long to be upheld. A book like the present symposium seems to herald this consciousness. In careful, semi-technical discussion it gives the outlines of what we are to be conscious of. No one need fear that the new economic and administrative emphasis on town-planning will necessarily destroy the earlier æsthetic one. As Mr. Olmsted says, "Regard for beauty must neither follow after regard for the practical ends to be obtained, nor precede it, but must inseparably accompany it."

Conquest by Law

An Introduction to Roman Dutch Law, by R. W. Lee. New York: Oxford University Press. $4.15.

THE author intended this book as a succinct and scholarly account of the common law prevailing in the Union of South Africa, Ceylon and British Guiana, and in this he has been successful in a manner deserving the thanks of all students of law. But to the general reader the book has an interest entirely unintended by the author—it shows how thoroughly the Romans finally conquered the Teutonic invaders of their empire, and how the English (not British) common law is now slowly but surely conquering, or at least assimilating, vast tracts of Roman law. It is only quite incidentally that Dean Lee mentions some of the influences of English law on the law of these erstwhile Dutch communities. But enough is indicated in the law of torts, the law of wills, and the law of persons, to show how thorough that influence has been. If the scope of this book had included legal procedure, criminal and public law, this influence would have been even more marked. If one wants to study the cement which keeps the British Empire together, if one wants to understand why the Dutch Boers, conquered after a bitter war that terminated hardly more than a decade ago, are now voluntarily fighting for Great Britain against the monarch who flattered them with open sympathy, while forty years was insufficient to reconcile the people of German Elsass to Prussia, let him study *inter alia* the methods by which English law is extended in the Dominions beyond the sea. He will learn that there are other methods of conquest besides that of the mailed fist.

DURAND
Steel Lockers

EVERY Durand Steel Locker is built to withstand the hardest usage, to meet the most exacting requirements, and to conform to the highest standards of design and finish.

Durand Steel Lockers are adapted for practically every purpose. They are *fire-proof, durable, sanitary, convenient* and *ornamental.*

Reasonable in price. Write for catalogue.

We are also manufacturers of steel shelving, steel bins and general steel factory equipment.

DURAND STEEL LOCKER CO.
1506 Ft. Dearborn Bk. Bldg. Chicago
906 Vanderbilt Bldg. New York

Copyright, Pach Bros.

THESE three distinguished Americans all speak in highest terms of the benefits of insurance protection. One of them has had five years of POSTAL LIFE protection.

Let the POSTAL solve *your* life-insurance problem

The POSTAL *employs no agents:* substantial savings thus effected go to *you* because you deal *direct.* You get *more* insurance for the *same* money, or the *same* insurance for *less* money.

The Company writes all the standard policy-forms and all are officially approved by the N. Y. State Insurance Department.

Find out what *you* can save at *your* age. In writing, simply say: "*Send full particulars as mentioned in The New Republic of May 13th.*" Also give *full name, occupation,* and *exact date of birth.*

POSTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
WM. R. MALONE, PRESIDENT
THIRTY-FIVE NASSAU STREET, NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED